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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Commissioner May Examine Taxpayer's Records for 
Years Barred by Statute of Limitations Without 
Proving Reasonable Suspicion of Fraud-
United States v. Powell* 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has power to summon 
witnesses and to examine records in order to ascertain the correct-
ness of a taxpayer's return.1 If a summons is not obeyed or if the 
records sought are not produced, the Commissioner may seek 
enforcement by applying to the proper federal district court.2 
Although the Commissioner's investigative powers are broad, they 
are not unlimited. In the absence of fraud, he must act within the 
confines of a three-year statute of limitations.8 In addition, the Code 
makes it abundantly clear that taxpayers may not be subjected to 
unnecessary examinations or investigations• and that records sought 
must be relevant or material.11 
In each of the principal cases, taxpayer was summoned to produce 
records for years which, in the absence of fraud, were no longer 
subject to examination because of the running of the statute of 
limitations. Upon taxpayer's refusal to produce his records, an 
internal revenue agent petitioned a federal district court to enforce 
the summons, claiming that examination was not foreclosed by the 
statute of limitations because the taxpayer had filed a fraudu}t!nt 
return. In issue in each of these cases was the question whether 
records for years barred by statute may be examined by means of an 
administrative summons if the issuing agent fails to disclose reason-
able grounds for his suspicion of fraud. Prior to the Supreme Court's 
recent decisions in Ryan v. United States6 and United States v. 
Powell,7 holdings in cases dealing with this issue were in conflict. 
In the Second8 and Sixth9 Circuits, an administrative summons 
• !179 U.S. 48 (1964). A companion case was Ryan v. United States, !179 U.S. 61 
(1964). · 
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. 
2. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(b). 
!I. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 650l(a), (c)(l). 
4. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7605(b). "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary 
examination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account 
shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless 
the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that 
an additional inspection is necessary." 
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. 
6. Ryan v. United States, !179 U.S. 61 (1964). 
7. United States v. Powell, !179 U.S. 48 (1964). 
8. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959); Norda Essential Oil &: 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 230 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); United States v. 
United Distillers Prod. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946); In re Paramount Jewelry 
[939] 
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would have been enforced even in the absence of evidence to support 
the agent's suspicion of fraud. The agent was required to prove 
only that the summons was issued in good faith pursuant to 
statutory authority and that the records sought were relevant or 
material. Typical of the position of these circuits is the Sixth 
Circuit's decision in the Ryan10 case. In that case, an administrative 
summons was enforced on the agent's statement that "reasonable 
grounds exist for a strong suspicion that defendant ... has made a 
fraudulent understatement of income."11 No evidence was introduced 
to support the agent's suspicion. 
The First,12 Third,13 Fourth,14 Seventh,15 and Ninth Circuits19 
took a different position. They would not have enforced an adminis-
trative summons unless the agent disclosed facts indicating reason-
able grounds for his suspicion of fraud.17 In the Powell case, the 
Third Circuit refused to enforce a summons because no evidence 
was introduced to support the agent's assertion that on the basis of 
information obtained in investigation of the taxpayer's returns, he 
had reason to suspect that fraudulent returns had been filed.18 
Similarly, in Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co.,19 the Ninth Circuit refused 
to enforce a summons when the only reason given for suspecting 
Co., 80 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Contra, In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., ll9 
F. Supp. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). 
9. United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1963), afj'd, 379 U.S. 61 (1964); 
Eberhart v. Broadrock Dev. Corp., 296 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962); Corbin Deposit Bank v. United States, 244 F.2d 177 (6th 
Cir. 1957) (per curiam): Kumick. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1956); 
Peoples Deposit Bank &: Trust Co. v. United States, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954). Contra, In the Matter of Wood, 130 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. 
Ky. 1955). 
10. Note 9 supra. 
11. United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500, 501 (6th Cir. 1963). 
12. Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959); O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 
F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958). 
13. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914 (lid Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 379 
U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Carey, 218 F. Supp. 298 (D. Del. 1963); Application 
of Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 325 F.2d 917 
(3d Cir. 1963); cf. Farmers' &: Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. United States, 11 F.2d 348 (lid 
Cir. 1926). 
14. Wall v. Mitchell, 287 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1961); In re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804 
(D. Md. 1937). 
15. McDermott v. Jifi.n Baumgarth Co., 286 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1961); United 
States Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Eshleman, 170 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1958). 
16. De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963); Boren v. Tuck.er, 239 F.2d 
767 (9th Cir. 1956); Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942). The De 
Masters court spoke in terms of "rational judgment" rather than "probable cause," 
but it seems to have required an equivalent level of proof. De Masters v. Arend, supra 
at 88-90. 
17. Although the Fifth Circuit has heard two cases dealing with the issue under 
discussion, Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956); Falsone v. 
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), its position is not clear. 
18. 325 F.2d 914, 916 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). 
19. 128 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1942). 
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fraud was that the return of the taxpayer's wife was being investi-
gated. In both Lash v. Nighosian,20 decided by the First Circuit, 
and De Masters v. Arend,21 decided by the Ninth Circuit, administra-
tive summonses were enforced. However, in these cases evidence 
was introduced to support the agent's suspicion of fraud. In Lash, 
the agent established that the taxpayer had made large, unsecured, 
low-rate loans to agents who had previously audited his returns. 
In De Masters, the agent testified that the increase in the taxpayers' 
net worth plus their estimated living expenses exceeded their 
reported income by more than ninety thousand dollars and that in 
one year bank deposits of their business exceeded reported gross 
receipts by more than seventeen thousand dollars. 
In affirming the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ryan and reversing 
the Third Circuit's decision in Powell, the Supreme Court held: 
"[T]he Government need make no showing of probable cause to 
suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question 
that judicial enforcement of the administrative summons would 
be an abusive use of the court's process, predicated on more 
than the fact of re-examination and the running of the statute 
of limitations on ordinary tax liability."22 
In so holding, the Court relied heavily upon the legislative history 
of section 7605(b)23 and adopted several arguments previously 
offered in support of the position of the Second and Sixth Circuits: 
The Court felt that taxpayers must realize that fraudulent practices 
will be discovered and penalized if our system of self-assessed revenue 
collection is to operate effectively. Therefore, the Commissioner 
must be freed from frustrating limitations upon his statutory duty 
to administer the Internal Revenue Code. Proof of probable cause 
is not necessary because such a requirement would curtail the 
Commissioner's investigative power and hamper administration of 
the Code.24 The taxpayer is still amply protected because enforce-
ment of the summons will be denied if the investigation is made in 
bad faith, if oppressive or abusive procedures are employed, or if 
the records sought are neither relevant nor material.215 Finally, the 
Court pointed out that other administrative agencies need not estab-
lish reasonable grounds for a suspicion of fraud in order to have 
summonses enforced.26 
20. 273 F.2d 185, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1959). 
21. 313 F.2d 79, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 
22. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964). 
23. Id. at 56. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Id. at 58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. 
26. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; see Administrative Procedure Act 
§ 6(c), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1958); 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(a)-(c) (1958) (SEC); 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1958) (FTC); 49 Stat. 
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These arguments are not convincing. According to the Powell 
decision at the Third Circuit level, the issuing agent would be 
required only to establish a reasonable basis for his suspicions in 
order to have a summons enforced; he would not actually have to 
prove fraud. Thus, the -Commissioner's investigative power would 
not be significantly weakened, because enforcement of a summons 
would be denied only if the agent were carrying on a mere explora-
tory fishing expedition. In addition, the taxpayer would be given 
better protection because he could not be subjected to numerous 
exploratory investigations even if such investigations were relevant 
or material and made in good faith. 
Although it is true that other administrative agencies need not 
establish reasonable grounds for suspicion of fraud in order to have 
an administrative summons enforced, it does not follow that this 
rule should also apply to the Internal Revenue Service. Unlike the 
Internal Revenue Service, other administrative agencies do not 
operate within the confines of a provision such as section 7605(b) of 
the Code, which prohibits unnecessary examinations.27 The predeces-
sor of section 7605(b) was enacted in 1921 in order to meet the 
objections of taxpayers that they were being subjected to onerous 
and unnecessarily frequent examinations.28 Because the ordinary 
individual will of necessity deal with the Internal Revenue Service 
many more times during his life than he will deal with the other 
agencies, it was natural for Congress to respond to his special 
problems by enacting this unique provision. However, the Supreme 
Court in Powell, relying mainly on passages from the congressional 
debates, concluded that the primary purpose of section 7605(b) "was 
no more than to emphasize the responsibility of agents to exercise 
prudent judgment in wielding the extensive powers granted to them 
by the Internal Revenue Code" and that "to import a probable cause 
standard ... would substantially overshoot the goal which the legis-
lators sought to attain."29 Such a conclusion seems fallacious. The 
debates on this point are, at most, equivocal.30 They indicate that 
what is presently section 7605(b) limits the Commissioner to one 
examination unless he indicates that there is a necessity for further 
examination,31 but there is nothing in the debates or in the Senate 
Report82 which indicates whal: is meant by the word necessity. On the 
other hand, the one point that is clear from both the debates and the 
856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825f(a)-(c)(l958) (FPC); Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: 
Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 Mrca. L. REv. 187 (1961). 
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b). 
28. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1921). 
29. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 56 (1964). 
30. See' 61 CONG. R.Ec. 5202, 5'855 (1921). 
31. Ia. at 5855. 
32. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1921). 
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Senate Report is that the provision was enacted solely for the tax.-
payer's benefit and protection. By deciding as it did in, Ryan and 
Powell, the Supreme Court seems to have ignored congressional 
intent to protect the tax.payer and has reduced section 7605(b) to 
little more than a passive reminder to the Commissioner that tax-
payers do have some rights. 
Finally, it should be noted that the fourth and fifth amendments 
to the Constitution have afforded little protection to a taxpayer faced 
with an administrative summons.33 The Supreme Court has held 
that the fourth amendment does not apply to any records that an 
individual is required by statute to keep34 and that the enforcement 
of an administrative summons does not violate the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.85 Al-
though the Supreme Court has not been faced with a tax case in 
which the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination 
has been in issue, it appears that a taxpayer has no 'right to resist 
government procurement of records required by law to be kept.86 As 
a result, the taxpayer may be forced to reveal incriminating records. 
But, by requiring, as a prerequisite to enforcement of an administra-
tive summons, a showing of reasonable grounds for suspicion of 
fraud, courts will be able to retain some of the philosophy behind 
the enactment of the fourth and fifth amendments without seriously 
hampering the collection of revenue. 
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in the Powell case suggests what 
seems to be the better criteria. In his opinion, re-examination of a 
tax.payer's statute-barred records is "unnecessary" within the meaning 
of section 7605(b) unless the court is shown that the taxpayer is not 
being subjected to administrative fiat or capriciousness and there is 
some evidence establishing a reasonable suspicion of fraud.87 Such 
a test would more properly balance the public interest in main-
taining the integrity of the tax collection system with the individual 
taxpayer's interest in freedom from unwarranted governmental 
investigation. 
33. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V. See United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 
U.S. 793 (1949); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Avakian, Searches and 
Seizures, N.Y.U. 17rn INST. ON FED. TAX 531 (1959); Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and 
Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, IO TAX L. REv. 191 (1954); Spilky, Have We Lost Our 
Civil Rights in Tax Matters, 37 TAXES 603 (1959); Note, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 676 (1957); 
1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 277. 
34. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948). 
35. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) . See generally 
De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963); National Plate & Window Glass Co. 
v. United States, 254 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1958). 
36. See Note, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 676, 696-99 (1957). 
37. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 59-60 (1964) (dissenting opinion). Mr. 
Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg joined in the dissent in Powell. In the Ryan 
case, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, but Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg 
concurred in the result because they felt that the Government had not acted 
capriciously. 
